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Abstract: 
The study of Roman political theory is undergoing a renaissance, and Daniel Kapust has added 
his own contribution to the discussion with this concise, accessible, and interesting volume. In 
this work, a revision and expansion of his dissertation, Kapust ‘explores rhetoric, liberty, and 
their relationship to social and political conflict in Roman thought of the first century BCE and 
the first century CE’ (6). He argues that the free exercise of rhetoric is inextricably bound 
together with the ideas of Republicanism and liberty. Rhetoric is necessary for political activity 
to occur, and represents the means by which a res publica is publicly defined and conceived (21). 
Kapust presents Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus as promoting, respectively, an antagonistic conception 
of rhetoric and community, a consensualist conception, and rhetoric as a means of navigating 
political unfreedom (22). 
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Article: 
The study of Roman political theory is undergoing a renaissance, and Daniel Kapust has added 
his own contribution to the discussion with this concise, accessible, and interesting volume. In 
this work, a revision and expansion of his dissertation, Kapust ‘explores rhetoric, liberty, and 
their relationship to social and political conflict in Roman thought of the first century BCE and 
the first century CE’ (6). He argues that the free exercise of rhetoric is inextricably bound 
together with the ideas of Republicanism and liberty. Rhetoric is necessary for political activity 
to occur, and represents the means by which a res publica is publicly defined and conceived (21). 
Kapust presents Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus as promoting, respectively, an antagonistic conception 
of rhetoric and community, a consensualist conception, and rhetoric as a means of navigating 
political unfreedom (22). 
It should be stated at the outset that Kapust is a political scientist, not a classical philologist. 
Thus his interest in Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus derives primarily from their importance to later 
political theorists. He does not read the works under discussion as rhetorical works, nor does he 
view their authors as philosophers. He is not concerned with discovering a unique political 
philosophy for each of the authors under discussion, but rather the ways that rhetoric, liberty, and 
conflict were conceived and expressed by them. Nor does he attempt to define the political 
nature of the Republic, though he does expressly state his opposition to Millar’s concept of a 
democratic Roman state.1 What Kapust does do – successfully, in my opinion – is to integrate 
modern political theory with a close reading of the ancient texts. 
 
The book is divided into six chapters, inclusive of the introduction, with a short epilogue. 
Kapust’s introduction is an impressive study in presenting modern political theory to a non-
specialist audience. The author runs through the major schools of thought on Republicanism, 
touching on the theories of Skinner, Pettit, Hobbes, Habermas, among others, providing an 
excellent foundation for the discussion which follows. He demonstrates well the relevance of 
applying modern theories to the ancient sources, particularly the theories of Hobbes (who plays a 
large role in the second and third chapters). 
 
The second and third chapters are devoted to Sallust. The second, “An Ambiguous Republican: 
Sallust on Fear, Conflict, and Community,” highlights the necessity of antagonistic politics for 
the continued health of the Republic. Kapust reads Sallust through Hobbes, though Kapust’s 
Sallust does not, like Hobbes, long for a state free from turmoil. For Sallust, conflict is both 
necessary and sufficient for the existence of the Republic. It was antagonistic politics which 
allowed Rome to become great, as men engaged in competition for personal glory, not world 
domination. While Cicero dreamt of otium cum dignitate, Sallust longed for concordia cum 
certamine. The lack of conflict, or rather, fear, is not a good thing, for when Rome lost her fear 
of external enemies, she turned against herself. Fear of external enemies is replaced by a 
fracturing of concord between the people and the upper-class. For Sallust, discord is part of the 
uncorrupted Roman past, though that type of struggle was ‘a manifestation of the energies 
released with political liberty, a struggle for the rewards of virtue, not of power’ (43). 
 
The third chapter, “Channeling Conflict through Antagonistic Rhetoric in the War with Catiline”, 
focuses on the speeches of Caesar and Cato. The most fruitful way to channel the antagonism 
described in Ch. 2 is through rhetoric. Rhetoric provides a means by which divergent elements in 
the state can be combined in a non-destructive fashion, and one of Sallust’s goals is to 
demonstrate the importance of rhetoric even in a troubled Republic. Antagonistic rhetoric 
provides an outlet for the tensions inherent in republican government. Through rhetoric, the 
disparate elements of the Roman state can reach consensus. This consensus is itself fluid, being 
always an ad hoc response to a immediate conflict. Thus the focus on the speeches of Caesar and 
Cato, which are, ‘a vivid representation of the problems inherent not just in the practice of 
rhetoric, but in a community like Rome, composed of different, conflicting, yet complementary 
individuals and groups’ (77). 
 
Chapter 4, “Exemplarity and Goodwill in Livy’s From the Founding of Rome,” is the only 
chapter devoted to Livy. The main argument here is that Livy stresses the importance of 
consensus and accommodation for the resolution of republican conflicts. Livy believes in a 
‘cooperative and accommodative rhetoric’ which stands in contrast to Sallust’s ‘antagonistic 
conception of rhetoric and politics’ (84); Livy thus aligns himself more closely with Cicero and 
his conception of the concordia ordinum than with Sallust. Kapust rightly highlights the 
exemplary nature of Livy’s history, in which Livy describes the ‘moral community’ of the 
Republic as having been both enabled and strengthened by the examples of its leaders, who 
worked both to balance the disparate parts of society and to unite them for the common weal. 
The primary method available for Rome’s leaders was rhetoric. Rhetoric can build goodwill – if 
not actual trust – between the elites and the masses. Goodwill, as Kapust describes it, is rooted in 
the attraction to and admiration of virtue, and bears a strong relationship to the use of ethos and 
pathos by an orator on his audience. The use of rhetoric, and what Kapust calls ‘the 
rhetoricization of leadership’, promotes goodwill and consensus, both of which are necessary 
requirements for the continuation of republican communities. 
 
The fifth and sixth chapters focus the works of Tacitus. In the fifth chapter, “Tacitus on Great 
Men, Bad Rulers, and Prudence”, Kapust argues that the Dialogus de Oratoribus and the 
Agricola present to their readers ‘a model of prudence that allows individuals to navigate the 
active life’ in imperial politics (26). Unfortunately, the section devoted to the Agricola, all three 
pages of it, seems like an afterthought, perhaps a remnant of a much longer discussion in the 
original dissertation. The chapter is thereby unbalanced, with a discussion of the Dialogus taking 
up the lion’s share of Kapust’s comments. The two main characters, Agricola and Maternus, are 
exemplars for how to treat the thorny problem of speaking with integrity while living under an 
autocrat – Agricola is to be emulated, Maternus to be denigrated. Agricola, milquetoast politician 
though he may have been, survived, and provides a useful paradigm for survival. Maternus, on 
the other hand, is not a good example of prudence, as he advocates only the extremes of blanket 
submission to the emperor or the complete withdrawal from public life. For the politically active 
Tacitus, the one avenue left open for the practice of rhetoric without the risk of obsequious 
encomium was history, with its potential to be both didactic and epideictic at the same time. 
 
The final chapter, “Tacitus’ Moral Histories”, presents Tacitus as a writer not only of moral 
history but also of ‘rhetorical history.’ The Annales and Histories give exempla of different types 
of ruler. By using these types as paradigms, one can estimate how ‘free’ the exercise of rhetoric 
will be during the reign of any future emperor. The end result, as it was with the works in the 
previous chapter, will be the successful deployment of prudence, which will in turn lead to 
success in public life. Tacitus engages in ‘practical theorizing suited to the cultivation of 
prudence,’ and, ultimately, an ‘implicit criticism’ of the principate (145). 
 
The bibliography is generally up-to-date, though it is limited almost exclusively to English-
language scholarship with a few striking omissions.2 There are a fair number of typographical 
errors and strange turns of phrase, though they do not detract from the understanding of the 
author’s argument. Only two caveats deserve mention. First, the errors in citation style and 
historical background are often glaring, and for some reason seem to be centered almost 
exclusively on Cicero. Kapust uses only Loebs for his Latin texts and citations, a decision which 
leads to some unconventional citations. References to the Pro Marcello are given for example, as 
‘3.8’ (p. 155, n. 63) instead of referencing the section number only. There are repeated references 
to Rep. 2.69a on pp. 82 and 101, though the Loeb of Rep does not list a section 2.69a. 
Furthermore, n. 112 on pg. 101 reads, in its entirety, “Cicero, On the Commonwealth, 5.6. Cf. 
Cicero, De Republica, 5.6.”; the two works are, of course, the same. He is misleading when he 
states that Cicero only speaks of ‘particular kings’ in Rep. 2; Cicero in fact speaks of six of the 
seven kings as having made positive contributions to the state, and even Tarquinius Superbus is 
praised for his occasional good deeds (Rep. 2.44). Cicero’s description of regal imperium in Leg. 
3.8 is misunderstood on p. 96. There is confusion between Tarquinius Superbus, his son Sextus 
Taquinius, and the decemvir Appius Claudius. Tarquinius is named as the decemvir who 
attempted to abduct Verginia; in addition, the author states that it was Tarquinius Superbus 
himself, not his son, who raped Lucretia (103). A further confusion in chronology appears on p. 
154. Att. 8.16.2 is said to describe ‘the conflict between Antonius [sic] and Caesar,’ but this 
letter, from early March 49, most assuredly refers to Pompey, not Antonius. 
 
Second, whither Cicero? The title of Kapust’s book gives no hint at the central importance of 
Cicero’s political thought for the author’s argument. This is a book as much about Cicero and the 
reception of his political and rhetorical theory as it is about the three titular authors. Cicero is the 
sine qua non of the argument, ‘a point of comparison to the historians,’ and Cicero’s writings – 
his philosophical ones in particular – ‘serve as crucial sources of ideas and themes’ (6). Cicero is, 
as Kapust himself states, ‘the entry point’ (3), but in fact he is also the journey and the exit: ‘it is 
fitting that we return to Cicero by way of conclusion’ (175). Though Kapust does an admirable 
job of inserting Cicero into each phase of the argument, a stand-along chapter on Cicero would 
have been a more than welcome addition. 
 
Despite the errors, and this reviewer’s wish for a more unified exposition of Cicero’s thought, 
there is much of value in Kapust’s book. The lack of jargon, the extremely useful bibliography, 
the breadth of the sources used, and the skillful way in which the author integrates modern 
theories with ancient, makes for a refreshing look at three well- known authors. While trained 
Classicists may find some of Kapust’s talking points to be well-worn, this book is a welcome 
addition to the scholarship on republican political theory. 
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